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A Stochastic Game Framework for Analyzing Computational
Investment Strategies in Distributed Computing
with Application to Blockchain Mining
Swapnil Dhamal, Tijani Chahed, Walid Ben-Ameur, Eitan Altman, Albert Sunny, and Sudheer Poojary
Abstract—We study a stochastic game framework with varying number of players, for modeling and analyzing their computational
investment strategies in distributed computing, for solving a problem such as in blockchain mining. In particular, we propose a
continuous time Markov chain model, where players arrive and depart according to a stochastic process, and determine their
investment strategies based on the state of the system. The players obtain a certain reward for being the first to solve the problem,
while incur a certain cost based on the time and computational power invested in the attempt to solve it. We consider that the players
are Markovian, that is, they determine their strategies which maximize their expected utilities, while ignoring past payoffs. We first study
a scenario where the rate of problem getting solved is proportional to the total computational power invested by the players. We show
that, in statewise Nash equilibrium, players with costs exceeding a certain threshold do not invest, while players with costs less than
this threshold invest maximum power. Further, we show that Markov perfect equilibrium follows a similar threshold policy, and the
players do not need to have knowledge of the system state. We then consider a scenario where the rate of problem getting solved is
independent of the computational power invested by players. Here, we show that, in statewise Nash equilibrium, only the players with
cost parameters in a relatively low range, invest. We also show that, in Markov perfect equilibrium, players invest proportionally to the
reward-cost ratio. Using simulations, we quantify the effects of arrival and departure rates on players’ expected utilities and provide
insights.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A distributed computing system comprises computers whichcommunicate and coordinate their actions by passing mes-
sages to each other, in order to achieve a common goal which
is usually solving a large problem. Distributed computing has
gained more popularity than ever before in recent years, owing
to the advent of blockchain technology. Blockchain has found
applications in a wide variety of fields [1], some of them be-
ing cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, smart contracts, reputation
systems, Internet of Things, security services, public services,
etc. The security of a blockchain relies primarily on a proof-
of-work procedure, where the providers of computational power
(referred to as miners) collect block data consisting of a number
of transactions, and repeatedly compute hashes on inputs (an input
usually contains the block data appended by a random number)
from a very large search space. A miner receives reward for mining
a block, if it finds one of the rare inputs that generates a hash value
satisfying certain constraints (such as having a very low value
in case of bitcoin) before everyone else. Owing to the usage of
cryptographic hash function, the best method for finding such an
input is randomized search.
Since the proof-of-work procedure is computationally very
intensive, successful mining of blocks usually requires the miners
to invest significantly with regard to computational power. This,
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in turn, involves a certain amount of cost for investing a certain
amount of computational power for certain amount of time. Once
a block is mined, it is transmitted to everyone, and the process
repeats for mining a new block. In this paper, we study the
stochastic game during the mining of one particular block, where
miners arrive and depart while a block is being mined. A miner’s
objective is to optimize its utility based on the offered reward for
successfully mining a block before everyone else, by strategizing
on the amount of computational power it should invest. There is
a natural tradeoff, since a higher computational investment by a
player would give it a higher chance of solving the problem before
everyone else, while a lower investment is advantageous since it
would reduce the cost incurred.
In this paper, we study two of the most common scenarios in
distributed computing. The first scenario considers that the rate of
problem getting solved is proportional to the total computational
power invested by the providers of computation. This is a more
classical scenario, where the problem to be solved is fixed, and the
more total power is invested to solve it, the faster it gets solved.
The second scenario addresses a different class of problems for
which, the rate of problem getting solved is independent of the
computational power invested by the miners. This could be owing
to some peculiar nature of the problem, or the system changing the
complexity of the problem depending on the total computational
power received from the providers, or if only a portion (which
could vary) of the received power is utilized by the system while
the remaining power is used for idling. Bitcoin mining is an
example of the system changing the problem complexity based
on the total computational power, such that the time required for
solving it with the received power, is 10 minutes on average. While
the problem complexity does not change amidst a problem getting
solved in bitcoin mining, our study of this scenario is motivated
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by the idea that the rate of problem getting solved could be
independent of the computational powers invested by the miners.
1.1 Preliminaries
We now provide a non-technical introduction to the important
concepts used in this paper. We will describe their technical details
after we propose our model in the next section.
1.1.1 Stochastic Game
A stochastic game [2] is a dynamic game with probabilistic transi-
tions across different states of the system. The players’ payoffs
and the probabilistic transitions between states depend on the
current state and the players’ strategies. The game continues until
it reaches a terminal state (or continues for infinite time in absence
of a terminal state). Stochastic games are thus a generalization of
both Markov decision processes and repeated games.
1.1.2 Statewise Nash Equilibrium (SNE)
Nash equilibrium of a game is a profile of strategies of the involved
players, from which no player can gain by a unilateral change of
strategy, if the strategies of other players remain unchanged. We
refer to statewise Nash equilibrium in stochastic game as a Nash
equilibrium when players play myopically by only looking at the
current state (without foreseeing the effects of their actions on the
state transitions and resulting utilities).
1.1.3 Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)
MPE [3] is an adaptation of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
to stochastic games. An MPE strategy of a player is a policy
function describing its strategy for each state (while ignoring any
history apart from the state information). Each player computes
its best response strategy in each state by foreseeing the effects
of its actions on the state transitions and resulting utilities, and
the strategies of the other players. A player’s MPE strategy is a
best response to the other players’ MPE strategies. In literature, for
analytical tractability, MPE strategies are assumed to be symmetric
(the decision policies of all players are identical in a given state).
Moreover, Schelling [4] argues that symmetric equilibria can be
perceived as stronger focal points than asymmetric ones.
1.2 Related Work
Stochastic games have been studied from a theoretical perspective
[5], [6], [7], [8], [9] as well as in a number of applications such as
computer networks [10], cognitive radio networks [11], wireless
network virtualization [12], queuing systems [13], multiagent rein-
forcement learning [14], committee bargaining [15], and modeling
complex living systems [16].
We enlist some of the important works on stochastic games.
Altman and Shimkin [17] consider a processor-sharing service
system, wherein an arriving customer observes the current load on
the shared system and chooses whether to join it or use a constant-
cost alternative such as a personal computer. The authors show that
any Nash equilibrium consists of threshold decision rules, with a
threshold on the queue length in the shared system. Nahir, Orda,
and Raz [18] also consider a similar setup, with the difference that
the customers consider using the shared system over a long time
scale and for multiple jobs; hence the decision of each customer
is a strategy on the portion of its jobs that would be served by the
shared system, instead of a single one-time binary decision in [17].
Hassin and Haviv [19] propose a version of subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium for games where the players are identical, and each
player selects a strategy based on its private information regarding
the state of the system. Wang and Zhang [20] investigate the Nash
equilibrium in a queuing system, where reentering the system is
a strategic decision of the customers. Hu and Wellman [21] use
the framework of general-sum stochastic games in order to extend
Q-learning to a noncooperative multiagent context, and find that
agents are more likely to reach a joint optimal path with Nash Q-
learning than with single-agent Q-learning. There have also been
works which develop algorithms for computing reasonably good,
not necessarily optimal, strategies in a state-learning setting [22],
[23].
There also exist game theoretic studies of distributed com-
puting [24], [25]. Wei et al. [26] consider a resource allocation
problem with constraints on quality of service, where customers
request resources across a cloud-based network. The authors
show existence of Nash equilibrium, if the resource allocation
game has feasible solutions. Chun et al. [27] analyze the selfish
caching problem, where selfish server nodes incur either cost for
replicating resources or cost for access to a remote replica, and
hence show the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. Grosu
and Chronopoulos [28] propose a game theoretic framework for
obtaining a user-optimal load balancing scheme in heterogeneous
distributed systems.
Zheng and Xie [1] present a broad survey on blockchain
technology. Sapirshtein, Sompolinsky, and Zohar [29] consider the
case of selfish mining attacks, where a miner postpones the trans-
mission of its mined blocks to other miners (since other miners
would start mining the next block immediately after receiving the
mined block, which may not be desired by the considered miner).
Lewenberg et al. [30] study pooled mining, in which miners form
coalitions where the obtained rewards are shared among their
members, thus reducing the variance of the reward obtained by
each player. Xiong et al. [31] consider a setting where miners can
offload the mining process to an edge computing service provider.
The authors models this as a Stackelberg game, where the service
provider sets the price of edge computing services, and then the
miners determine the amount of service to purchase based on the
observed prices. Kiayias et al. [32] consider a stochastic game,
where each state of the game corresponds to the mined blocks and
the players who mined them. A player strategizes on which blocks
to mine and when to transmit the blocks to other players.
In general, there exist game theoretic studies for distributed
computing, as well as stochastic games for other applications
including blockchain mining where a state signifies the state of
the chain or tree of blocks. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work to study a stochastic game framework for distributed
computing considering the number of players to be dynamic.
2 OUR MODEL
Consider a distributed computing system wherein agents provide
their computational power to the system, and receive a certain
reward r in return. In order to model the real-world scenario where
the set of such agents is not static owing to their arrivals and
departures, we consider a standard queueing setting where agents
arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ, and the departure
times of the agents are independent and identically distributed as
per exponential distribution with rate µ. The stochastic arrival
of agents is natural, like in most applications. However, even
their stochastic departure is well justified here. Agents would
usually shut down their computers on a regular basis, or terminate
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computationally demanding mining task so as to run other tasks.
Since mining is a high-speed continuous process, it is not practical
for agents to consistently keep track of whether the mining of
the current block has completed. So agents may randomly depart
before its completion.
We could hence view this setup as a continuous time multi-
state process, where each state corresponds to a set of players in
the system. Since in general, the agents involved at any given time
would influence each others’ payoffs, it results in a game. The
stochastic arrival and departure of players makes it a stochastic
game. As we shall see, there are other stochastic events in addition
to arrivals and departures, and which depend on the players’
strategies.
2.1 Model Elements
2.1.1 State Space
We analyze this system from the viewpoint of a typical player,
which we label as player i. Hence, instead of considering a state
as the set of players in the system, we could consider it as the
set of players apart from player i. We assume that the players
are homogeneous, that is, the parameters corresponding to all the
players are the same. This is a standard assumption in the literature
on stochastic games in order to have the size of the state space,
linear rather than exponential in the number of players. Hence a
system state, say n, corresponds to the number of other players in
system.
From the viewpoint of player i, the process initiates from some
initial state m at time t= 0, that is, there are m other players in
system when i enters. Since a typical blockchain system requires
a majority consensus to ensure validity of a mined block, we
assume a minimum of 2 players in the system for blockchain’s
sustainability (for instance, the system could be configured so that
a system-controlled miner is triggered whenever the number of
miners is detected to be less than 2). Also, the system can typically
accommodate a certain maximum number of players at any given
time, say N (which could be very large). Hence the possible states
in which player i can enter are 1, . . . , N − 1. Let [n] denote the
set of players in state n apart from player i, and [n⊕ i] denote the
set of players in state n including player i.
2.1.2 Players’ Strategies
Let x(n,t)i denote the strategy of player i (that is, the computational
power that it decides to invest) at time t when the system is in
state n. Since players use a randomized search approach over a
very large search space, the search follows a memoryless property,
that is, the time required to find the solution in this search space is
independent of the search space explored thus far. Also, note that a
player does not have incentive to change its strategy amidst a state
owing to this memoryless property and if no other player changes
its strategy. Hence in our analysis, we consider that no player
changes its strategy within a state. So we have x(n,t)i = x
(n,t′)
i for
any t, t′; hence player i’s strategy could be written as a function of
the state, that is, x(n)i . Let x
(n) denote the strategy profile of the
players in state n. Let x = (x(1), . . . ,x(N−1)) denote the policy
profile.
We denote by a cost parameter ci, the cost incurred by player i
for investing unit amount of computational power for unit amount
of time. We assume that players have no constraint on how much
cost they can afford to incur. Instead, we consider that players
aim to maximize their expected payoffs (the expected reward they
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Fig. 1. The underlying continuous time Markov chain from the viewpoint
of a typical player i
would obtain minus the expected cost they would incur), while
forgetting the cost they have incurred thus far. That is, players are
Markovian.
2.1.3 Rate of the Problem Getting Solved
Recall that the time required to find solution in the very large
search space is independent of the search space explored thus far.
We consider this time to be exponentially distributed owing to its
memoryless property. Let Γ(n,x
(n)) be the corresponding rate of
problem getting solved in state n when the players’ strategy profile
is x(n). Since the time required is independent of the search space
explored thus far, the probability that a player finds the solution
before all other players at time t is proportional to its invested
computational power at time t.
Note that the time required for the problem to get solved is the
minimum of the times required by the players to solve the prob-
lem. Also, the minimum of exponentially distributed random vari-
ables, is another exponentially distributed random variable with
rate which is the sum of the rates corresponding to the original
random variables. And the probability of an original random vari-
able being the minimum, is proportional to its rate. Let P(n,x
(n))
j
be the rate (corresponding to an exponentially distributed random
variable) of player j solving the problem in state n, when the strat-
egy profile is x(n). So we have Γ(n,x
(n)) =
∑
j∈[n⊕i] P
(n,x(n))
j .
Since the probability that player i solves the problem before the
other players is proportional to its invested computational power at
that time, we have that the rate of player i solving the problem is
P(n,x
(n))
i =
x
(n)
i∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
Γ(n,x
(n)), and the rate of other players
solving the problem is Q(n,x
(n))
i =
∑
j∈[n] x
(n)
j∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
Γ(n,x
(n)).
2.1.4 The Continuous Time Markov Chain
Figure 1 depicts the CTMC from the viewpoint of player i (only
the relevant transition rates are shown, for clarity). The circled
states are the states in which player i can enter the system.
With our assumption of Markovian players, coupled with the
memoryless property of the computation done thus far, the system
transiting from state n to state n′ is equivalent to the player
reentering the system in state n′. So the expression for expected
utility could be written in a recursive form, which we now derive.
Table 1 presents the notation. The possible events that can occur
in a state n ∈ {2, . . . , N − 2} are:
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1) the problem gets solved by player i with rate P(n,x
(n))
i =
x
(n)
i∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
Γ(n,x
(n)), thus terminating the game in the
absorbing state Sn where i gets a reward of r;
2) the problem gets solved by another player j ∈ [n] with
rate Q(n,x
(n))
i =
∑
j∈[n] x
(n)
j∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
Γ(n,x
(n)), thus terminating the
game in the absorbing state F where i gets no reward;
3) a new player arrives and the system transits to state n + 1
with rate λ;
4) one of the other players j ∈ [n] departs and the system
transits to state n− 1 with rate nµ;
5) player i departs with rate µ, thus ending the game for player
i with no reward in absorbing state U .
So, the sojourn time in state n is (Γ(n,x
(n))+λ+(n+1)µ)−1.
The corresponding expected cost to i is cix
(n)
i
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x
(n))
.
2.1.5 Expression for Expected Utility
The probability of an event occurring before any other event is
equivalent to the corresponding exponentially distributed random
variable being the minimum, which in turn, is proportional to its
rate. So the expected utility of player i as computed in state n ∈
{2, . . . , N − 2} is
R
(n,x)
i =
Γ(n,x
(n)) x
(n)
i∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
(r) +
Γ(n,x
(n))
∑
j∈[n] x
(n)
j∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
(0)
+
λ
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
R
(n+1,x)
i +
nµ
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
R
(n−1,x)
i
+
µ
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
(0)− cix
(n)
i
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
=
Γ(n,x
(n))
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
r
x
(n)
i∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
− cix
(n)
i
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
+
λ
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
R
(n+1,x)
i +
nµ
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
R
(n−1,x)
i
(1)
For n=1, the common denominator is λ+ µ+ Γ(1,x
(1)) and the
term corresponding to R(n−1,x)i vanishes.
For n =N − 1, common denominator is Nµ + Γ(N−1,x(N−1))
and the term corresponding to R(n+1,x)i vanishes.
The above expression for expected utility is derived consider-
ing that player i obtains a reward of r with probability proportional
to its invested computational power if the problem gets solved
(the blockchain mining setting). However, it can be noted that the
expression holds even if we consider that the obtained reward is
proportional to the invested computational power (the classical
distributed computing setting).
Note that in connection with a standard MDP, we do not
incorporate an explicit discounting factor. However in our case,
the utility can be viewed as discounting the future owing to the
player exiting the system with a certain probability in any state. We
highlight that our analyses are easily generalizable if an explicit
discounting factor is incorporated.
2.1.6 Convergence of Expected Utility
LetR(x)i be vector whose n
th component isR(n,x)i . We show from
above recursive expression that R(x)i converges for any policy
profile x. Let W(x) be the matrix whose elements are as follows:
TABLE 1
Notation
i the player under consideration
r reward offered for solving the problem
ci cost incurred by player i when it invests unit power
for unit time
λ arrival rate of players
µ departure rate of players
n number of other players in the system
x
(n)
i strategy of player i in state n
x(n) strategy profile of players in state n
x policy profile
Γ(n,x
(n)) rate of problem getting solved in state n under strat-
egy profile x(n)
R
(n,x)
i expected utility of player i computed in state n under
policy profile x
[n] set of other players in state n
[n⊕ i] set of players in state n including player i
For n = 2, . . . , N − 2 :
W (x)(n, n+ 1) =
λ
λ+ (n+ 1)µ+ Γ(n,x(n))
and
W (x)(n, n− 1) = nµ
λ+ (n+ 1)µ+ Γ(n,x(n))
.
W (x)(1, 2)=
λ
λ+µ+Γ(1,x(1))
.
W (x)(N−1, N−2)= (N−1)µ
Nµ+Γ(N−1,x(N−1))
.
All other elements of W(x) are 0. So we have that W(x) is a
strictly substochastic matrix, that is, the sum of the elements in
each of its rows is less than 1.
Let Z(x)i be the vector whose n
th component is Z(n,x)i , where
For n = 2, . . . , N − 2 :
Z
(n,x)
i =
(
Γ(n,x
(n))∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
r−ci
)
x
(n)
i
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
.
Z
(1,x)
i =
(
Γ(n,x
(n))∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
r−ci
)
x
(1)
i
λ+µ+Γ(1,x(1))
.
Z
(N−1,x)
i =
(
Γ(n,x
(n))∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
r−ci
)
x
(N−1)
i
Nµ+Γ(N−1,x(N−1))
.
Proposition 1. R(x)i = (I−W(x))−1Z(x)i
Proof. Let R(x)i〈t〉 = (R
(1,x)
i〈t〉 , . . . , R
(N−1,x)
i〈t〉 )
T , where t is the
iteration number. The iteration for the value of R(x)i〈t〉 starts at
t = 0, and we examine if it converges when t → ∞. Now, the
expression for the expected utility in all states can be written in
matrix form as
R
(x)
i〈t〉 = W
(x)R
(x)
i〈t−1〉 + Z
(x)
i
= W(x)
(
W(x)R
(x)
i〈t−2〉 + Z
(x)
i
)
+ Z
(x)
i
=
(
W(x)
)2
R
(x)
i〈t−2〉 + (W
(x) + I)Z
(x)
i
=
(
W(x)
)t
R
(x)
i〈0〉 +
(
t−1∑
η=0
(
W(x)
)η)
Z
(x)
i
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Now, since W(x) is a strictly substochastic matrix (with
the sum of each of its rows being strictly less than 1),
its spectral radius is less than 1. So when t → ∞, we
have limt→∞
(
W(x)
)t
= 0. Since R(x)i〈0〉 is a finite con-
stant, we have limt→∞
(
W(x)
)t
R
(x)
i〈0〉 = 0. Furthermore,
limt→∞
∑t−1
η=0
(
W(x)
)η
= (I − W(x))−1, an established
matrix identity [33]. This implicitly means that (I −W(x)) is
invertible. Hence,
lim
t→∞
R
(x)
i〈t〉 = limt→∞
(
W(x)
)t
R
(x)
i〈0〉 +
( ∞∑
η=0
(
W(x)
)η)
Z
(x)
i
= 0+ (I−W(x))−1Z(x)i
Since W(x) and I −W(x) are tridiagonal matrices, a very
general analysis would demand the results on the inverse and
powers of tridiagonal matrices [34]. In this paper, we consider
two special scenarios, which are the most common in a distributed
computing system, for which we can circumvent the usage of these
intricate results.
2.2 Outline of Our Analyses
In the two scenarios that we study, we first derive SNE (assuming
myopic players). We conduct a general analysis for SNE while
considering that the players could be heterogeneous, that is, their
cost parameters could be different. The SNE for homogeneous
players directly follows. As explained earlier, for finding MPE in
the stochastic game (considering Markovian players), we consider
that the players are homogeneous, as is standard in the literature
for analytical tractability. We hence provide insights on our results,
while also comparing the strategies of Markovian players with
that of myopic players. We follow our theoretical analysis with
simulations for quantifying the effects of system parameters on
players’ utilities.
3 SCENARIO 1: RATE OF PROBLEM GETTING
SOLVED IS PROPORTIONAL TO THE PLAYERS’ TO-
TAL INVESTMENT
Here, we consider that rate of problem getting solved in state
n under strategy profile x(n) is Γ(n,x
(n)) = γ
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j ,
where γ is the (rate) constant of proportionality determined by the
distributed computing system.
3.1 Statewise Nash Equilibrium
Let V (n,x
(n))
i be the expected utility of a player i in state n,
computed myopically (that is, without foreseeing state transitions).
Hence V (n,x
(n))
i can be viewed as R
(n,x)
i with λ = µ = 0 (in
Equation (1)). That is,
V
(n,x(n))
i =(γr−ci)
x
(n)
i
γ
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
=
(
r− ci
γ
)
x
(n)
i∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
So V (n,x
(n))
i is an increasing function of x
(n)
i if ci < γr,
a decreasing function of x(n)i if ci > γr, and a constant zero-
function if ci = γr. So it is a dominant strategy for any player i
to invest its maximum power if ci < γr, no power if ci > γr,
and any amount of power if ci = γr. That is, the SNE strategy
of a player follows a threshold policy, with a threshold on its cost
parameter (whether it is lower than γr) or alternatively, a threshold
on the offered reward (whether it is higher than ciγ ).
Hence, for homogeneous case where cj = c,∀j ∈ [n⊕ i], all
players invest their maximum powers if c < γr, no player invests
if c > γr, and players invest any amount if c = γr. So the
expected utility in SNE is 0 if c ≥ γr; while if c < γr,
considering that the players have a maximum computational power
of x, the expected utility in SNE is
Vˆ
(n,x(n))
i =
(
r − c
γ
)
x
(n+ 1)x
=
1
n+ 1
(
r − c
γ
)
3.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Let Rˆ(n,x)i be the equilibrium utility of player i in state n, that is,
when player i plays the best response strategy to the equilibrium
strategies of other players j ∈ [n] (while foreseeing effects of
its actions on the state transitions and resulting utilities). We can
determine MPE similar to finding optimal policy in MDP (using
policy-value iterations to reach a fixed point which acts as an
optimal policy). Here, for maximizing Rˆ(n,x)i , we assume that we
have optimized for other states and use those values to find an
optimizing x for maximizing Rˆ(n,x)i . In our case, we have derived
a closed form expression for vector R(x)i in terms of policy x
(Proposition 1); so we could effectively determine the fixed point
directly.
A policy is said to be proper if from any initial state, the
probability of achieving a terminal state is strictly positive. Con-
sider the condition that, there exists at least one proper policy, and
for any non-proper policy, there exists at least one state where
the corresponding value function is negatively unbounded. It is
known that, under this condition, the optimal value function is
bounded, and it is the unique fixed point of the optimal Bellman
operator [35]. This condition is satisfied by our model, since there
does not exist any non-proper policy. Now, from Equation (1), the
Bellman equations for each state n ∈ {2, . . . , N − 2} for player
i can be written as
Rˆ
(n,x)
i = max
x
{
x
(n)
i
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
(
Γ(n,x
(n))∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
r − c
)
+
λ
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
Rˆ
(n+1,x)
i +
nµ
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x(n))
Rˆ
(n−1,x)
i
}
As earlier, for n= 1, common denominator is λ + µ + Γ(1,x
(1))
and term corresponding to Rˆ(n−1,x)i vanishes. For n = N − 1,
the common denominator is Nµ + Γ(N−1,x
(N−1)) and term
corresponding to Rˆ(n+1,x)i vanishes. For this scenario, we have
Γ(n,x
(n)) = γ
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j .
We now derive results leading to the derivation of MPE, the
proofs of which are provided in the supplemental file.
Lemma 1. In Scenario 1, for any state n and policy profile x,
R
(n,x)
i < r − cγ if γr > c, and R(n,x)i > r − cγ if γr < c.
Proof. Let V(x)i be the vector whose n
th component is V (n,x
(n))
i ,
the expected utility of player i in state n computed myopically. Let
Z
(x)
i = Y
(x)V
(x)
i . Note that when Γ
(n,x(n)) = γ
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j ,
we have that Y(x) is a diagonal matrix, with diagonal elements
Y (x)(n, n) =
γ
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
λ+(n+1)µ+Γ(n,x
(n))
(the denominator is replaced
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by λ+µ+Γ(1,x
(1)) for n = 1 and by Nµ+Γ(N−1,x
(N−1)) for
n = N − 1). When Γ(n,x(n)) = γ∑j∈[n⊕i] x(n)j , we have that
W(x) +Y(x) is strictly substochastic matrix (the sum of each of
its rows is less than 1).
Let U(x) = (I −W(x))−1Y(x)1, where 1 is the vector
whose each element is 1. It is clear that all the elements of U(x)
are non-negative. We will now show that ||U(x)||∞ < 1, that is,
the maximum element of the vector U(x) is less than 1. Let un0
be the element with the maximum value (one of the maximum, if
there are multiple). Suppose u(x)n0 = ||U(x)||∞ ≥ 1. So we would
have
U(x) = (I−W(x))−1Y(x)1
=⇒ U(x) = W(x)U(x) +Y(x)1
=⇒ u(x)n0 =
N−1∑
j=1
u
(x)
j W
(x)(n0, j) + Y
(x)(n0, n0)
=⇒ u(x)n0 ≤ u(x)n0
N−1∑
j=1
W (x)(n0, j) + u
(x)
n0 Y
(x)(n0, n0)
(∵ max
j
u
(x)
j = u
(x)
n0 ≥ 1)
=⇒
N−1∑
j=1
W (x)(n0, j) + Y
(x)(n0, n0) ≥ 1
However, this is a contradiction since W(x) + Y(x) is
strictly substochastic. So, we have shown that ||U(x)||∞ =
||(I −W(x))−1Y(x)1||∞ < 1. That is, (I −W(x))−1Y(x)
is strictly substochastic.
From Proposition 1, R(x)i = (I −W(x))−1Y(x)V(x)i . Since
(I −W(x))−1Y(x) is strictly substochastic, R(n,x)i for each n
is a linear combination (with weights summing to less than 1) of
V
(n,x(n))
i over all n’s.
For each n, V (n,x
(n))
i =
(
r − cγ
)
x
(n)
i∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
. So we have
V
(n,x(n))
i ≤ r − cγ , if γr>c, and V (n,x
(n))
i ≥ r − cγ , if γr<c.
Since R(n,x)i for each n is a linear combination (with weights
summing to less than 1) of V (n,x
(n))
i over all n’s, we have
R
(n,x)
i <r − cγ if γr>c, and R(n,x)i >r − cγ if γr<c.
Lemma 2. In Scenario 1, R(n,x)i is monotone function of x
(n)
i .
Proof. Let us define the following for simplifying notation.
A
(n,x)
i =

λRˆ
(n+1,x)
i +nµRˆ
(n−1,x)
i , for n = 2, . . . , N−2
λRˆ
(n+1,x)
i , for n = 1
nµRˆ
(n−1,x)
i , for n = N−1
E
(n,x(n))
i =

λ+(n+1)µ+γ
∑
j∈[n]
x
(n)
j , for n = 2, . . . , N−2
λ+µ+γ
∑
j∈[n]
x
(n)
j , for n = 1
(n+1)µ+γ
∑
j∈[n]
x
(n)
j , for n = N−1
Hence we can write
R
(n,x)
i =
A
(n,x)
i + (γr − c)x(n)i
E
(n,x(n))
i + γx
(n)
i
dR
(n,x)
i
dx
(n)
i
=
(γr−c)
(
E
(n,x(n))
i +γx
(n)
i
)
−γ
(
A
(n,x)
i +(γr−c)x(n)i
)
(
E
(n,x(n))
i +γx
(n)
i
)2
=
(γr − c)E(n,x(n))i − γA(n,x)i(
E
(n,x(n))
i + γx
(n)
i
)2
The denominator is positive, while the numerator is a constant
with respect to x(n)i , since A
(n,x)
i and E
(n,x(n))
i do not depend on
x
(n)
i . So R
(n,x)
i is a monotone function of x
(n)
i , and whether it
is increasing or decreasing, depends on the sign of the numerator:
(γr − c)E(n,x(n))i − γA(n,x)i .
Proposition 2. In MPE for Scenario 1, each player invests the
maximum power if γr > c, no power if γr < c, and any amount
of power if γr = c.
The proof shows that dR
(n,x)
i
dx
(n)
i
has the same sign as γr − c, which
then results in a consistent solution (or equivalently, a fixed point)
to the above Bellman equations.
Proof. Let W (n,x) be the nth row of W(x).
From the proof of Lemma 2, dR
(n,x)
i
dx
(n)
i
has the same sign as (γr −
c)E
(n,x(n))
i − γA(n,x)i . Now,
(γr − c)E(n,x(n))i − γA(n,x)i
= (γr − c)E(n,x(n))i − γW (n,x)Rˆ(n,x)i (E(n,x
(n))
i + γx
(n)
i )
= (γr − c)E(n,x(n))i − γ(Rˆ(n,x)i − Z(n,x)i )(E(n,x
(n))
i + γx
(n)
i )
= (γr − c)E(n,x(n))i −γRˆ(n,x)i (E(n,x
(n))
i +γx
(n)
i )
+γ
(γr − c)x(n)i
E
(n,x(n))
i +γx
(n)
i
(E
(n,x(n))
i +γx
(n)
i )
= (γr−c)E(n,x(n))i −γRˆ(n,x)i (E(n,x
(n))
i +γx
(n)
i )+γ(γr−c)x(n)i
= (γr−c)E(n,x(n))i −γRˆ(n,x)i E(n,x
(n))
i +γx
(n)
i (γr−c−γRˆ(n,x)i )
= E
(n,x(n))
i (γr − c− γRˆ(n,x)i ) + γx(n)i (γr − c− γRˆ(n,x)i )
= (γr − c− γRˆ(n,x)i )(E(n,x
(n))
i + γx
(n)
i )
= γ
(
r − c
γ
− Rˆ(n,x)i
)
(E
(n,x(n))
i + γx
(n)
i )
Since E(n,x
(n))
i + γx
(n)
i is positive, and the sign of(
r − cγ − Rˆ(n,x)i
)
is the same as that of (γr−c) from Lemma 1,
we have that dR
(n,x)
i
dx
(n)
i
has the same sign as (γr − c). Also, note
that if γr = c, we have R(n,x)i = 0,∀n from Proposition 1 when
Γ(n,x
(n)) = γ
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j .
So in any state n, a player invests the maximum power if
γr > c, no power if γr < c, and any amount of power if γr =
c. Since we consider that the players are homogeneous and the
computational power of each player is usually bounded (let the
common bound be x), we can assume that each player invests x if
γr > c.
Hence we have a consistent solution for the Bellman equations
that the players invest x if γr > c, 0 if γr < c, and any power in
the range [0, x] if γr = c.
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Note that if all the involved players have practically infinite
computational power when γr > c, the limit of the expected
utility R(n,x)i computed in any state n is
1
n+1
(
r − cγ
)
. This is
same as the expected utility in SNE. It can also be noted that,
since the equilibrium strategy does not depend on the number of
players, the assumption of knowing the number of other players
can be relaxed.
3.3 Insights
• The policy profiles in SNE and MPE are the same, that
is, there is no distinction between myopic and Markovian
players with respect to equilibrium strategies. It is notewor-
thy that, if players have unbounded computational power,
expected utilities in MPE and SNE are also same.
• The players follow a thresholding policy in both types of
equilibria. γr < c results in a system where it is disadvan-
tageous to invest, while γr > c results in a system where
everyone would want to invest their maximum power.
• MPE policy is independent of the number of players in the
system; when this number is high, the competition drives
each player to invest heavily; when this number is low, each
player invests heavily so that the problem gets solved faster
(before arrival of additional competing players).
• The players are inclined towards investing a maximal amount
of power when γr > c; however this is not inefficient since
the power would be spent for less time as the problem would
get solved faster.
• The expected utility in state n (when there are n+ 1 players
in the system) in SNE as well as in MPE (when x→∞)
is
(
r
n+1 − cγ(n+1)
)
. This is intuitive, since the reward is
expected to be won by the players with equal probability
(hence the term rn+1 ) and the cost is reduced owing to
the joint rate of the problem getting solved (hence the term
c
γ(n+1) ).
Insight behind MPE and SNE profiles being same
From Proposition 1, R(x)i = (I −W(x))−1Z(x)i . For γr > c,
when the invested power xi increases, Z
(x)
i increases and (I −
W(x))−1 decreases. But from the proof of Proposition 2, we know
thatR(x)i increases with xi when γr > c, implying that the rate of
increase of Z(x)i dominates the rate of decrease of (I−W(x))−1.
So, the effect of W(x) and hence the state transitions is relatively
weak, thus resulting in Markovian players playing SNE strategy
itself. Similar argument holds for γr ≤ c. It would be interesting
to study scenarios where the rate of problem getting solved is
proportional to a non-linear function of the players’ investments.
While a linear function is suited to most distributed computing
applications including blockchain mining, a non-linear function
could possibly see W(x) having a strong effect leading to MPE
being different from SNE.
4 SCENARIO 2: RATE OF PROBLEM GETTING
SOLVED IS INDEPENDENT OF THE PLAYERS’ IN-
VESTMENTS
Here, we assume Γ(n,x
(n)) = γf(n + 1), where γ is a constant.
f(n + 1) is a function of the number of players in the system at
state n; f(n+1) could be 1 in which case, the rate of the problem
getting solved is constant γ.
4.1 Statewise Nash Equilibrium
The expected utility computed myopically by player i in state n
(from Equation (1) with λ = µ = 0) is
V
(n,x(n))
i = −
cix
(n)
i
γf(n+ 1)
+ r
x
(n)
i∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
It is easy to see that V (n,x
(n))
i is a concave function with respect
to x(n)i . The first order condition
dV
(n,x(n))
i
dx
(n)
i
= 0 gives
0 = − ci
γf(n+ 1)
+ r
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j − x(n)i(∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
)2
⇐⇒ x(n)i =
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j
1− ci
γrf(n+1)
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j
 (2)
Summing the above over all players, we get
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j =
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j
(n+1)− ∑j∈[n⊕i] cj
γrf(n+1)
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j

So either
∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j = 0, which means x
(n)
j = 0,∀j ∈
[n⊕ i], or
1 = n+ 1−
∑
j∈[n⊕i] cj
γrf(n+1)
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j
⇐⇒
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j =
nγrf(n+1)∑
j∈[n⊕i] cj
(Note that all players investing 0 is not SNE, since any player can
deviate to invest a positive amount of power and obtain the full
reward.)
Substituting the above expression in Equation (2), we get
x
(n)
i =
nγrf(n+ 1)∑
j∈[n⊕i] cj
(
1− ci
γrf(n+ 1)
nγrf(n+ 1)∑
j∈[n⊕i] cj
)
=
nγrf(n+ 1)(∑
j∈[n⊕i] cj
)2
 ∑
j∈[n⊕i]
cj − nci

So x(n)i ≥ 0 if
∑
j∈[n⊕i] cj − nci ≥ 0 or equivalently, ci ≤∑
j∈[n] cj
n−1 . So the players which do not satisfy this constraint can
be effectively removed from the system. Let T be the set of players
who would invest. Players with the cost parameter violating the
constraint can hence be iteratively removed, until the constraint
cj ≤
∑
j′∈T cj′
|T |−1 is satisfied for all players j ∈ T . It can be easily
seen that this results in a unique set of players investing, and hence
a unique SNE.
For homogeneous case: cj = c,∀j ∈ [n⊕ i], we get
x
(n)
i =
nγrf(n+ 1)
((n+ 1)c)2
((n+ 1)c− nc)
=
γr
c
(
nf(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2
)
The expected utility in SNE is, thus, Vˆ (n,x
(n))
i =
r
(n+1)2 .
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4.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Proposition 3. In MPE for Scenario 2 where the rate of problem
getting solved is γf(n + 1) in state n, each player invests
γr
c
(
nf(n+1)
(n+1)2
)
.
Proof. Recall that since W(x) is strictly substochastic,
(I−W(x))−1 = limt→∞
∑t−1
η=0
(
W(x)
)η
. Since all the ele-
ments of W(x) are non-negative, all the elements of
(
W(x)
)η
also are non-negative for any natural number η, and hence all the
elements of
(
I−W(x)
)−1
are non-negative. So if we ensure
that the components of Z(x)i (namely, Z
(n,x)
i ) are individually
maximized with respect to x(n)i , we would essentially maximize
all the elements of R(x)i = (I −W(x))−1Z(x)i , since W(x) is
independent of x(n)i in this scenario.
It can be easily shown that Z(n,x)i is concave with respect to
x
(n)
i . The first order condition
dZ
(n,x)
i
dx
(n)
i
= 0 gives
− c
λ+(n+1)µ+γf(n+1)
+
γf(n+1)
λ+(n+1)µ+γf(n+1)
r
1∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
− γf(n+1)
λ+(n+1)µ+γf(n+1)
r
x
(n)
i(∑
j∈[n⊕i] x
(n)
j
)2 = 0
⇐⇒ x(n)i =
∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j −
c
γrf(n+ 1)
 ∑
j∈[n⊕i]
x
(n)
j
2
(Note that in first order condition, the denominator λ + (n +
1)µ + γf(n + 1) is replaced by λ + γf(n + 1) for n = 1 and
by Nµ+ γf(n+ 1) for n = N − 1; however it vanishes and so
the derivation is general for all n).
Replacing player i with any player j ∈ [n] does not change
the above analysis, and the above expression involves the sum of
strategies of all the players (which is common to all) and also
the common parameters. Hence substituting x(n)j = x
(n)
i ,∀j ∈
[n⊕ i], we get that either x(n)j = 0,∀j ∈ [n⊕ i], or
x
(n)
i =
γr
c
(
nf(n+ 1)
(n+ 1)2
)
(Note that all players investing 0 is not an equilibrium policy, since
any player can deviate to invest a positive amount of power and
obtain the full reward.)
For f(n + 1) = n + 1, which means that the rate of problem
getting solved is proportional to the number of players, the strategy
simplifies to x(n)i =
γr
c
(
n
n+1
)
. For f(n+ 1) = 1, which means
that the rate of problem getting solved is constant, the strategy
simplifies to x(n)i =
γr
c
(
n
(n+1)2
)
. It can be shown that for non-
negligible number of players, this computational power decreases
with the number of players if f(·) is sublinear, else it increases
with the number of players.
4.3 Insights
• The policy profiles in SNE and MPE are the same; so myopic
and Markovian players act the same in equilibrium.
• In SNE with heterogeneous players, only the players with
the low-range cost parameters invest. Usually, small players
would have high cost parameters; so if the players are
rational, the competition would be among big players who
usually have low cost parameters.
• In MPE, players invest proportionally to the reward-cost ratio
( rc ), and unlike Scenario 1, the policy depends on the number
of players in the system. Unlike Scenario 1, it is beneficial
for the homogeneous players to invest even if their common
cost parameter is very high.
• Since the rate of problem getting solved does not depend on
the computational investments, the players could reduce their
equilibrium investments proportionally and still obtain the
same expected reward with a reduced cost. However, such a
strategy is not an equilibrium, since if other players have low
investments, a player can deviate and lead the competition,
which would then be followed by other players deviating in
order to stay competitive.
• The equilibrium power decreases with the number of players
(for a non-negligible number of players) if f(·) is sublinear,
else it increases.
Insight behind MPE and SNE profiles being same
The transition rates are independent of the players’ strategies in
this scenario. It can be easily shown that, if W(x) is constant w.r.t.
players’ strategies, then the MPE utility in any state (R(n,x)i ) is a
linear combination (with constant coefficients) of the SNE utilities
(V (n,x
(n))
i ) in all states (the argument goes on similar lines as
the first paragraph of the proof of Proposition 3). So, if there is
a best strategy in each individual state without considering state
transitions, these individual strategies collectively form the best
policy (best strategy in each state while considering transitions).
So, the SNE strategy profiles in individual states collectively form
the MPE policy profile.
5 SIMULATION STUDY
Throughout the paper, we determined the SNE and MPE strate-
gies, which were found to be independent of the arrival and depar-
ture rates of the players. In this section, we quantify the effects
of these rates on the corresponding utilities using simulations.
Furthermore, while our analysis showed that the strategies in SNE
and MPE are the same for both the scenarios, the values of the
corresponding expected utilities are expected to be different, in
general, which we now quantify.
We use numbers from bitcoin mining in our simulations. The
current offered reward for successfully mining a block is 12.5
bitcoins. Assuming 1 bitcoin ≈ $8000, the reward translates to
$105. The bitcoin problem complexity is set such that it takes
around 10 minutes on average for a block to get mined. That is, the
rate of problem getting solved is 0.1 per minute on average. One
of the most powerful ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit)
currently available in market is Antminer S9, which performs
computations of upto 13 TeraHashes per sec, while consuming
about 1.5 kWh in 1 hour, which translates to $0.18 per hour (at
the rate of $0.12 per kWh), equivalently $0.003 per minute. As
per BitNode (bitnodes.earn.com), a crawler developed to estimate
the size of bitcoin network, the number of bitcoin miners is around
104. Hence, we consider r = 105, γ = 0.1, c = 0.003, N = 104.
5.1 Simulation Results
As seen from Figures 2 and 3, the curves concerning expected
utility generally follow a near-linear curve (of a negative slope)
on the log-log scale, with respect to the number of other players
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Fig. 2. Expected utilities in Scenario 1
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Fig. 3. Expected utilities in Scenario 2 with constant rate
in system. So the curves actually follow power law; scaling the
number of other players by a constant factor would result in
proportionate scaling of expected utility.
5.1.1 Scenario 1
Here, we suppose that the maximum computational power avail-
able to the players is x. Figure 2 presents the plots for expected
utilities with the analyzed MPE policy for different values of λ
and µ, and compares them against the expected utilities in SNE.
Following are some insights:
• As we discussed in the section on Scenario 1, the expected
utilities in MPE are bounded by 1n+1
(
r − cγ
)
, which is
same as the expected utility in SNE.
• In Scenario 1, a higher λ results in a higher likelihood of the
system having more players, which results in a higher rate
of the problem getting solved as well as more competition.
This, in turn, reduces the time spent in the system as well as
probability of winning for each player, which hence reduces
the cost incurred as well as expected reward. Figure 2(a)
suggests that, as λ changes, the change in cost incurred
balances with the change in expected reward, since the
change in expected utility is insignificant.
• For a given µ, if the number of players changes, there is
balanced tradeoff between the cost incurred as well as ex-
pected reward as above, and so the change in expected utility
is insignificant. However, as µ increases, the probability of
player exiting the system increases, thus resulting in a lower
expected utility (Figure 2(b)).
5.1.2 Scenario 2 with constant rate
As an imitation of bitcoin mining, we consider f(n + 1) = 1,
that is, the rate of problem getting solved is a constant γ. Figure 3
presents the plots for expected utilities with the analyzed MPE
policy for different values of λ and µ, and compares them against
the expected utilities in SNE. Following are some insights:
• An increase in the number of players increases the com-
petition with no balancing factor (unlike Scenario 1); so
probability of winning and hence expected utility reduces.
• For a higher λ, there is a higher likelihood of the system
having more players, which thus results in a lower ex-
pected utility owing to aforementioned reason. Also, from
Figure 3(a), if λ is not very high, an increase in µ is likely to
reduce the competition to the extent that, the expected MPE
utility in a higher state can exceed the corresponding SNE
utility (which would be very low; recall that we quantified it
to be r(n+1)2 in the section on Scenario 2).
• As µ increases, there is a higher likelihood of the competition
decreasing, however the probability of the player exiting the
system also increases; this results in a tradeoff. Figure 3(b)
shows that the effect of probability of the player leaving the
system dominates the effect of reduction in competition. For
similar reasons as above, the expected MPE utility in a higher
state can exceed the corresponding SNE utility.
6 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studied a stochastic game framework, highlighting
its application to blockchain mining; however the framework is
suitable for distributed computing in a very general sense, as
explained in the formulation of the utility function. We studied two
scenarios depending on whether the rate of problem getting solved
depends on the computational power invested by the players. We
hence provided detailed insights on our analytical and simulation
results for both scenarios.
This work has a number of interesting future directions. One
could study a scenario where the rate of problem getting solved
depends on the computational powers invested by the players,
but not necessarily proportional to the sum of their invested
computational powers. One could also study a scenario where the
cost increases non-linearly with the computational power invested.
It would be interesting to formulate and study the stochastic
game involving players solving multiple problems in sequence.
One could study a setting where players’ departures depend on
past outcomes, or some other condition such as the cost incurred
thus far exceeding a certain budget. A Stackelberg game could
be studied where, the system decides the amount of reward to
be offered, and then the miners decide how much computational
power to invest based on the offered reward. From the perspective
of mechanism design, it would be interesting to elicit the true cost
parameters of the miners.
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